关于百度以及数字音乐的比较中肯的评价
以下为转载,原文出处
http://www.sina.com.cn 2008年03月06日 10:33 通信信息报
原文题目为《洪波:唱片公司应学盛大才能生存》 ,是不靠谱的标题党编辑贴的题目,弃之不用。
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-本报记者 廖庆升
“去百度搜歌,上迅雷下电影”早已成为很多网民的习惯。但这样的免费大餐也一直是版权公司的眼中钉。继迅雷遭遇美国电影协会诉讼之后,近日,中国音乐著作权协会将百度音乐搜索告上了法庭。音乐著作权协会总干事屈景明表示:百度向网友免费提供歌曲网上传播服务已侵犯音乐权利人利益,要求立即停止并公开道歉,同时赔偿著作权使用费和诉讼支出106万余元。但在互联网评论人士洪波看来,唱片公司只有顺应互联网潮流才能生存。
记者:版权所有者为什么总是找百度?
洪波:中国的音乐搜索服务是全世界最发达的,几乎所有本土搜索引擎服务商都提供该项服务,而且它们几乎全部直接或间接地涉及知识产权问题。根据 CNNIC第21次互联网调查报告,音乐服务以86.6%的使用率,成为中国网民使用最普遍的互联网应用。因此,音乐搜索服务能够为搜索引擎网站带来巨大的流量和用户。而根据统计,百度在音乐搜索市场的份额高达92.8%,这就不难理解百度为什么总是成为靶子。在唱片公司看来,如果放着大老虎不打,打再多小老虎也达不到阻止侵权的目标。
记者:106万元的索赔额度似乎并不大,音乐著作权协会是否有更深层次想法?
洪波:我想,以百度目前在音乐娱乐市场的影响力,唱片公司几乎没有选择,它们必须与百度合作。但如何合作,以什么样的价码合作,却大有讲究。实际上,在上次7大唱片公司集体起诉百度的过程中,百代和金牌两家唱片公司就中途退出诉讼,成为百度的合作伙伴。索赔并不是目的,这个索赔额度可能连聘请律师、取证、公证的费用都不够。唱片公司之所以愿意赔本赚吆喝,是因为他们期望这个吆喝可以为他们带来足够大的利益:官司的胜诉可以带给他们更大的利益,即便不胜诉,也至少可以保持一种道义和法律上的压力。
记者:中国音乐著作权协会表示百度里有大量的搜索结果来源于一个根本就不可以公开访问的网站,即没有可访问的音乐来源。依据你的专业理解,其原因是什么?这可否成为百度侵权的证据?
洪波:除非唱片公司有铁的证据证明,该网站直接或间接为百度所有,否则它根本成不了百度直接侵权的证据。由于音乐搜索一般并不能给提供音乐文件的网站带去用户,常常只是占用它们的带宽,所以在整个互联网音乐下载的产业链条中,音乐网站能从搜索引擎获得的好处很少,损失的利益却很大,导致很多音乐网站被迫对搜索引擎做出限制。长期看,这最终将让音乐搜索本身的价值缩水。所以,搜索引擎公司为了保持其音乐搜索的有效性,可能会自建音乐服务器。但这需要证据,无可辩驳的证据。
记者:在你看来,百度会如何应对?
洪波:百度仍然会强调,它并不提供那些侵权材料,它只是一个搜索引擎,那些侵权材料原本就存在于互联网上,百度只是通过自己的搜索技术,对他们进行了索引、排序,这个过程无法对海量的被索引内容的合法性进行判断。不过我想,诉讼双方打这场官司,不是为了把关系打僵,也不是为了彻底打死谁,最终双方会坐到谈判桌前,谈一个可以被双方接受的价码,然后开始合作。百度少不了会跟唱片公司进行私下的沟通,甚至进行必要的让步。毕竟,这是个数字化的时代,百度有数字化技术和用户,唱片公司有数字化内容,合作才符合它们双方的最大利益。
记者:如果百度败诉,对百度和搜索界会带来什么样的影响?
洪波:如果百度败诉,对百度或多或少会有一些不利影响,首先是品牌和声誉上的影响。其次是用户搜索体验上的影响,可能确实会有相当数量的音乐内容检索不到或无法直接下载,那些更小的音乐搜索服务商和音乐网站可能会因此得利。
记者:百度停止提供MP3搜索会给百度、互联网以及用户带来什么样的后果?
洪波:我认为百度不可能停掉MP3搜索,尽管MP3搜索让百度一直背负着道德和法律的双重压力。现实是,86.6%的中国互联网用户,成为包括百度在内的免费音乐下载服务的实际受益者,我想这是这些服务存在的首要前提。即使这些免费服务将来全都不存在了,绝大部分用户也不可能花钱去买一张正版 CD。唱片公司必须明白这一点,他们可以干掉百度MP3,但他们同时也干掉了他们自己的消费者,却几乎不可能增加他们的收入。
记者:在你看来,影视、音乐类版权作品如何与数字化结合才能最终避免类似版权事件的发生?
洪波:时代变了。在过去,唱片公司通过打击盗版CD,可以增加正版CD的销量。但在数字化时代,音乐通过互联网传播,在PC、iPod、手机和其他MP3播放设备中存储、播放,原来可以保护唱片公司的物理介质(磁带、CD等)已经不复存在,一切数字化的存在,都可以被无限次地复制和传播。唱片公司每一次挥舞法律大棒,表面上是针对服务商,实际都是针对它们自己的消费者,唱片公司和它们的消费者之间的关系,从来没有像今天这么剑拔弩张。谁错了?我坚信,错的永远都不会是消费者。唱片公司过去曾经生产快乐,现在它们只生产愤怒和怨恨。陈旧的知识产权体系正在把数字化内容的消费者异化成贼,异化成敌人,在这种情况下,赢了官司却失去未来。当越来越多的艺人开始抛开唱片公司,将自己的作品放到网上,唱片公司如果不能跟上时代,转变观念,它们终将被消费者抛弃。
互联网的发展太快,让很多传统的既得利益者还无法从容应对。版权正在死去,但唱片公司仍指望垂死的版权可以保护他们过去的好时光,所以他们就很难顺应时代,改变自己。消费者需要的是快乐,而非专辑。如果唱片公司只会制造专辑,不会生产快乐,版权就只能为他们准备一个精致的墓穴。
中国最有可能率先建立新的数字娱乐产业链,因为严厉的版权体系还未来得及成为这个市场的主体,数字娱乐就野火春风一般地发展起来了。娱乐从业者应该认真研究盛大等网络游戏公司成功的原因,应该认真研究粉丝如何成了一股势力,应该还娱乐为娱乐,而不是一堆精美包装的版权垃圾。躺在版权上看世界,满眼都是盗版。放弃版权,海阔天空。
一起2
概念与产品的关系,就如同蛋与鸡的关系,互相既不充分也不必要。很难说是先有概念还是先有产品,更不能说有了什么概念就一定会有什么相应的产品。也很难想象,头脑正常的人连产品也不好好看看就会花钱去买概念——当然,概念二道贩子除外。
“2”是目前颇为流行的一个概念——它的流行之处在于,很多以2为荣的人其实并不懂得“2”的含义,只是期望着能够蒙骗和自己一样2的人而已。XX2.0是常用的模式,就如同我以下举的例子。
与此类似的荒谬是“own this idea”。通常都是些很有自知之明的营销人喜欢用这句话——因为他们心底里深知自己在玩虚的,因此就迫不及待要握点实在东西在手里。只可惜玩虚玩惯的人通常分不清楚什么是实的,所以才会一厢情愿的以为自己先说出来就是自己的,或者自己说出来的就一定有人买。前者如冰咖啡,后者如太空酒。
如果没有“2”,电视还是那个电视,广告栏还是那个广告栏;现在他们2了,就俨然有了鼓动金主们一起跟着2的架势。我不知道他们的电视是交互触摸屏的还是提供UGC接口的,也不知道明明连1也不是的液晶屏何以当起这个“2”来。反正硕大无朋的2闪来闪去,在我每次上电梯的时候不忘问我一句 :今天,你2了没有?

音乐的前世今生
1. 命中注定
这一段是看《付费音乐之死》 有感而发。 某猫经常不厚道,嘴上不饶人,白白看了人家码了那么的字还要说人家题不搭意逻辑混乱——因此请大家千万要当我没说这句话。
音乐是伴随着人类而生的。从唯心主义形而上学观点来说,人类感知到的乐音才是音乐。因为自然界的风声语声,各种动物的鸣叫呼号,都是先人类而有的——只有当人类感知了这一切,并结合因自己的情绪而创造的各种声音,才最终创造了音乐。关于音乐的起源,有劳动号子说,也有宗教祭祀说。一般来说劳动号子是起源,宗教祭祀是推波助澜,总之我们要牢记最重要的一点:最开始的时候,音乐是不要钱的。
再往深了说,钱只不过是货币符号。货币只不过是商品交换的媒介。音乐开始收钱,就意味着音乐成了商品。商品 是用于交换的劳动产品。商品交换的前提是社会化分工的出现。所以,音乐开始收费,最根本的原因是社会化分工。由于分工和专业化出现了专业的音乐人,在遥远的过去主要有歌唱家和演奏家两种,虽然在恍若隔世的今天我们也没发明出来第三种。
以上逻辑说明:付费音乐产生的根源是社会化分工。音乐产品本身蕴涵人类劳动、具有可交换的价值,因此只要社会分工存在,就会有专业的音乐人用专业化的音乐与他人进行交换。综上,音乐从免费到收费,是生产力和社会分工发展的必然趋势,这个趋势不可逆,付费音乐不会死。
用反证法来说,如果付费音乐死了,那就意味着
音乐不需要用来交换——音乐方向的社会分工不复存在——人人都是水平相同的音乐家——我们凭常识知道这是不可能的;
或者音乐本身没有价值——音乐本身没有凝聚人类的劳动——请用实例反驳第二段第一句话。
如果天朝信奉的某马的某哲学是真理而不是谬误,那么以上的正向证明和反相证明就都是成立的。由此可知付费音乐不会死。我引的那篇文章从题目开始就是错的。这种错误完全可以用简单的逻辑证明,甚至不需要看原文作者写了些什么——所以,急急忙忙打开链接的各位,你们白看了。哦耶。(我最近很喜欢这个语气词)
(另,关于某马的某哲学问题,请自行与天朝相关官员讨论,本猫不对任何后果负任何责任。)
2. 错觉. 错觉
唱片行业学杜鹃啼那个血也不是一天两天了。在日韩两国百万唱片已近绝迹,一个歌手能卖出十万唱片就值得庆贺,你说这算不算江河日下?
算啊当然算。但是这和音乐有什么关系?唱片行业等于音乐吗?唱片等于音乐吗?
音乐,是猿人形态的老祖宗们捉了一只兔子烤着吃,一边烤一边哼哼
音乐,是孔子同学梦想着要来个乾坤大挪移来恢复的周礼
音乐,是隋炀帝游江南时船工的号子
音乐,是Fredric大帝充任间谍时唱起的歌谣
音乐,是莫扎特在宫廷里献给达官贵人的表演
音乐,是贝多芬与命运抗争时发出的怒吼
音乐,是维也纳交响乐团奏响的旋律
音乐,是Beatles在世界各地点燃的火爆演出现场
音乐,是电视节目和电台广播
音乐是吱呀的黑胶唱片
音乐是盒式磁带在Walkman里边转
音乐是一张张CD光盘,以及行将就木的Sony MD盘
音乐是无形的数字文件,在网络上以光电的速度流传
唱片并不是音乐的开始,更不可能是音乐的总结。历史在发展,技术在进步,音乐的传播范围只会更广,传播成本只会更低廉,这本是我们应该顺其自然见怪不怪的事情。黑胶死了我们没哭,磁带死了我们没哭,为什么CD死了大家就大惊小怪的?也许总有一天硬盘和闪存都会死 ,莫非还要如丧考妣跟着陪葬么?
3. 虚实之间
脱离开载体单看音乐的话,我们应该说音乐是无形的精神产品。无论是演唱家的歌声绕梁,还是演奏者的器乐悠扬,都是凝练了作者和表现者的天赋与精神的成果。也因如此,早期的听众们才会如此关注“原汁原味”,因为同一首歌或曲离开了那个人,甚至离开了那个乐器,就俨然变成了另外一个东西。在这个阶段,音乐的精神体被固化在某个人和某种乐器上,虽然天籁乐声回荡在虚无飘渺间,它却必须依附某种实体而存在,自然就倍受时间与空间的限制。无论是音乐还是欣赏音乐的人,都是不自由的。
音乐产业的发展史,其实就是试图将音乐从时间与空间的束缚中释放的历史,试图将音乐的精神体与其不得不依附的实体相剥离的历史。而从古到近,我们能使用的释放和剥离方式只有一种——复制。通过制造和散播复制体打破空间的局限,通过复制体的延续打破时间的牢笼。模仿、学习和传承可视为这种剥离的早期形态,例如学生学会老师的技巧,模仿大师的作品的风格和韵味,实际上是在进行复制工作,只是这种复制质量相当不稳定,真正与原作相差无几的为数寥寥——剩下的,或者做到了“青出于蓝而胜于蓝”(这当然是好事,但是其老师的本事没有得以保存也是事实),或者是“神情相近,韵味全无”——总之,缺乏科技手段的辅助,单靠人力进行这种复制工作相当的不靠谱。
后来的故事大家都知道,我们有了留声机、电唱机、磁带录音机等一系列记录声音和乐音的手段,所谓的Label公司们也开始随着唱片和磁带蓬勃发展。此时的音乐与上一时期有了本质的差别:音乐实现了与“人”的剥离,进入了“物化”阶段。精神体的音乐开始依附在一张张唱片、一盘盘磁带上按个数出售,购买一个个音乐的过程和机制与一个个买馒头别无二致。这是个最好的时代,脱离了作者与演奏者的音乐纷纷投入唱片公司麾下,随着各种营销手段飞向四面八方,让天涯海角的人们也有缘耳闻;这是个最坏的时代,一首首曲目被五马分尸魂飞魄散:灵魂归作者,神智归表演者,身体归Label——不亚于上帝的归上帝,撒旦的归撒旦。在这个物化的时代,拥有物化的身体的唱片公司无疑占了上风,他们如此春风得意,以至于在不久的将来已经忘记了自己拥有不过是音乐的躯壳,而非音乐本身。
直到磁带的时刻,音乐已经获得了大半的自有但仍然不是全部的自由。磁带及以前的所有复制手段仍是在模仿源音乐的振动——包括“人化”的模仿也是如此——记录振动,复制振动,在通过播放手段将振动“翻译”成乐音。这种复制手段的致命弱点是复制损失。每一次复制都伴随某种程度的损耗而不是百分百一致,甚至不仅复制品有缺失,连源音也会在复制过程中损失。也因此唱片时期(甚至到了磁带时期)所谓的“盗版”并没有成为label们致命一击。毕竟,唱片公司的专业技术与消费者拿自己家的普通机器复制出来的东西还是有差异;在“原版”和“盗版”之间,仍然有不可逾越的质量鸿沟。
综上,从老祖宗们在远古的呼号到19世纪中期留声机雏形问世,音乐走过了一条由虚到实,由“人化”到“物化”的道路。这条路的真正的名字是自由。不被宇宙的时间和空间束缚,在任何一个时间任何一个空间都可以被欣赏到的自由。走这条路的代价是音乐本身的分裂,以及强制将无形的精神产品固化在以个计数的实物上,以适应实物商品买卖的需要。在分裂和物化的过程中产生了新的社会分工,唱片公司出现并承担了物化、复制和散播环节的工作。
到此为止,似乎一切都很好。唱片公司们在笑,因为他们不知道,音乐总有一天会回归到虚无,而他们自己只是社会生产力发展过程中的一朵必将消逝的浪花。
4. 魂兮归来
其实某猫很想知道,20世纪80年代激光唱片问世的时候,唱片公司们究竟是在笑还是在哭。的确,这个新技术意味着更加完美的复制,更加简便的传播,更加永久的保存,然而唱片公司们江河日下的今天,也伴随着CD唱片的出现同时埋下了伏笔。
激光唱片与以往的所有复制音乐的技术有一个本质的差别:这次,它是百分百准确的数字复制,而不是以往的模拟复制。一旦将一首音乐编译成数字文件,这个文件就可以轻易进行无数次的无损复制——一切都只是0和1两个数字而已,尽管音乐还依附着唱片的实体,但是在实质上已经借助数码完成了虚化。CD盘真的有必要么?一个传说是1982年激光唱片问世了,另一个传说是与此同时思科的两位创始人正在斯坦福大学里想方设法用计算机网络传输晚餐的菜单。对于计算机和计算机网络来说,音乐文件和菜单文件有区别么?
所以,如果唱片公司第一眼看到激光唱片的时候没有立刻感到晴天霹雳五雷轰顶,那可真是一件奇怪的事情;就好像从那时起冉冉几十年从指尖滑落,他们直到今天才大喊日子不好过……那张死刑判决书不是从一开始就递给你了么?
总而言之,现在,音乐已经自由了,虽然是以数码之名,而不是以音乐本身之名。以人类目前的进化程度来说,我们也想象不出以本身形态自由化的音乐究竟是什么样子的……脑波传递……心有灵犀……那是特异功能吧。
CD唱片出现之后发生的事情大家都清楚,况且一切就在我们眼前发生。不多说了。
5. 替罪羊
说起所谓的盗版泛滥,所谓的网络侵权,有些人真的很冤。
比如说搜索引擎。从逻辑上说,百度并没有屯一堆mp3文件在自己的服务器上,它不过把搜索指令进行了归类而已。使用搜索引擎查找最匹配的内容需要一点技巧的,比如在google上搜索mp3就需要手动输入一堆指令 ,例如“index of”(目录) + “mp3″(音乐格式) + “beatles”(音乐人名) -html -htm -php”。只是百度头脑灵活一点,把这条(以及)类似的指令做成了一个固定的服务。以google的搜索能力,可以搜到好多开放FTP上的音乐文件,我们暂且假设百度也有相同强大的搜索能力,毕竟它说自己更懂中文。
那么问题就出现了:首先,百度mp3本身显然没有盗版,它顶多是方便了盗版活动而已;其次,我们有什么权力判定互联网上的音乐都是盗版?如果我买了一张CD,我把它扔在路上任人拣走,我算不算散播盗版,这个人算不算获取盗版内容?那么,我买了一张CD,把内容上传到我自己的开放FTP上,结果被某人用搜索引擎搜到了并下载,那么我算不算散播盗版?这个某人算不算获取盗版内容?
同样的,napster被活埋,verycd却安然无恙,也是因为前者经手了内容,后者却只提供了链接。
再追根抛底的说一下,搜索引擎并不是导致盗版泛滥的根源。在中国,盗版泛滥的根本原因是:1. 网络和家用电脑的普及; 2. 闪存mp3跌倒白菜价。1 提供了数字音乐文件的来源,2提供了数字音乐文件的去处。网络只会继续普及,数字音乐播放器是大势所趋,网络上的数字文件只会更多不会更少,这是历史的潮流,而唱片公司不是。
6. 生财无道
唱片公司并不是真的恨数字文件。事实上,如果没有数字音乐技术,喜欢音乐的人不会像今天这么多,人们可以消费音乐的机会也不会这么多,因而音乐的生意机会也不会这么多。
唱片公司其实是在恨自己。恨自己很傻很天真,自不量力的逆历史潮流而动浪费了大好光阴,还有,到现在也没想出来怎么用数字音乐赚钱。
不会赚钱的公司必定要灭亡。商业界从来也没有保护过不会赚钱的产业。为什么唱片公司不可以死掉?
歌曲的著作权、艺人的经纪约、唱片的灌制发行权以及诸如此类,在音乐的虚化和人化的时代并没有分得这么清楚,只是在音乐的物化时代才出现的,只是为了将无形的音乐固化在一个个载体上才出现的。现在,音乐回归到了虚化,那么为什么这些还要继续存在?如果这些权利分离都不存在了,那么现在的唱片公司——如果它们坚持要做现在这样的唱片公司的话——将何去何从呢?
数码在解决了音乐的复制和传播问题的同时,也极大的降低了音乐的制作成本。当一切固化手段的成本都变得微不足道的时候,剩下的最有价值的只有两样东西:一是音乐生产者的才华,二是音乐需求者的注意力。如何做出好的音乐,如何让好的音乐被别人听到注意到,成为核心问题。
相传最近在音乐界进行的一次调研显示,关于数字音乐和网络传播,独立音乐人的态度要远比唱片公司乐观,因为他们掌握着才华——至于注意力,在网络时代,音乐需求者的注意力未必就掌握在唱片公司手里。
如果艾米街 (现在是Amazon的了)成为未来最为成功的Label(假如那时候还有Label一说),我不会奇怪。如果今天的这些Label将来变成了艾米街或者别的什么东西,我也不会奇怪。如果未来的音乐靠大家自觉付钱,或者是不限量package,或者全部靠广告支撑,我都不会奇怪。
这是一个全新的时代,自然要用全新的方法赚钱,还没发现好方法并不等于赚不到钱,更不等于这个时代是错误的,毕竟历史发展到今天是必然,而你今天一定要赚钱并不是必然。
这是一个再好不过的时代,尘归尘,土归土,虚无的回归虚无,完初的回归完初。
我拭目以待。
那一张又一张虎皮
据说是《写网站策划书要知道的十九个理论》。这个题目当然很标题党,不过内文倒也把最近流行的一些理论攒到一起了。扯起虎皮当大旗,写个策划骗生意。那些老外写书时还是蛮认真的,结果就这样被囫囵吞枣当幌子用了,不知算是有幸还是无幸。
转在这里,只当个书目用好了。
一、二八法则
二、CIS理论系统(企业识别系统)
三、USP理论(独特销售主张)
四、SWOT分析法
五、5W2H法
六、马太效应
七、马斯洛需求理论
八、麦克尔·波特竞争理论
九、蓝海战略
十、长尾理论
十一、定位理论
十二、品牌形象论
十三、木桶理论
十四、羊群效应
十五、4P理论
十六、4C理论
十七、果子效应
十八、魏斯曼营销战略学说及竞争四种手段
十九、CI系统
第十九条分明和第一条是一样的。可见原文作者也攒晕头了……
Pride
去年就写好的,却一直标记为“隐藏”的文章。现在终于可以放出来了。其实很悲凉。
(音乐在feed里出不来的话,请点击到网页吧)
「君のその自由が眩しすぎる」
“Your freedom is so bright”
と言う少女に
When a young girl said
「存在する意味すら見つけられなくでも?」
“Even though I can’t find the meaning of my life?”
と答えた
I replied
人がもしない物ばかりを
If people are creatures
ねだる生き物だとしたら
Who beg for things they don’t have
僕たちが本当にほしい物は
Then what on earth
いったいなんだろう
Do we really want?
それからも少女はひたすらに
After all that struggling
もがいたあげく
She realised how futile it was
こみ上げる虚しさに気づいたとき
And till then, the girl
新たな発見を
Made a new discovery
僕たちはいつも
It’s by always dreaming
夢を見る事で明日への扉開く
That we open the door to tomorrow
この世界に確かなものなど
Even knowing
ないことを知ってても
That nothing in this world is certain
きっとある
Surely
まだ見ぬ場所には
There are flowers waiting for us
僕たちの待つ花が
In a place we haven’t seen yet
飽きることに
Before
なれて
We get used to
加速してしまう
Being fed up
その前に
We’d speed up
あそこがもし この世の果てでも
Ah, even if that place is the end of the world
他人が無駄だと笑っても
Even if people laugh and say all is in vain
共に行こう あきらめるよりも
Let’s go there together
怖いことなど ないのだから
Because nothing scares me more than giving up
===========================================
In memory of 2006.
The summer of 2006, like most summers I had experienced before, was a mess.
In June, after months of preparation, the launch of MW finally started and went as smoothly as I had expected. After nearly a month of traveling around and giving trainings to distributors and sales, I successfully turned those who never before touched salad dressing business into experts of this category who could coach the buyers of stores. Pity that I don’t do insurance or pyramid selling. Pity that the launch went so smoothly that I had to deal with troublesome goods return when MW failed due to a thoroughly foreseeable and avoidable quality issue in August.
In July, after months of preparation, the distributor stock return of Sgs finally started and went as bumpily as I had expected. Countless meetings with Finance and Tax to discuss invoices wearing red or blue, ah, and with IS to persuade systems to recognize each other’s strange names. It was also great fun to design the report format and explain to sales to ensure getting accurate feedback. For company K, Sgs, after its entering China over 10 years ago, meant write-off at cost of millions in the end, in my hand, and nothing else.
In July, my former boss was transferred to North Region Director position and North Region Director became my new boss. It was OK. It was really OK that my poor new boss was pushed onto the line of 2007 OB planning about 1 month after his accession. And I, the one who had been maintaining the MS Excel format OB system and improving it with dazzling MS Excel tricks, the one who had just been out of trainee stage for mere half a year but had done a beautiful and skillful presentation in English at the trainee graduation ceremony, was chosen to cooperate with FP&A to assist Boss to plan 2007 OB and prepare the presentation deck in MS PowerPoint format. God save Bill Gates.
In August, I made an discovery which astonished no other than myself that the 2007 OB, and probably all the OB before and after that, had been/was/ would be built upon 100% assumption. One of the few facts that was referred to was the National Store Information which I planned and carried out at Q1 of 2006. In the Q3 feedback, listing fee cost showed 25% increase than Q1 while store numbers remained stable. Yet the feedback was not only weaved into the OB, but also warmly welcomed because it perfectly explained to management team the dramatic increase of 2007 OB upon the 2006 version. This is reality, we said in the deck, and is up to management to decide whether to accept it. For me, this was yet another part of the 100% assumption: we ASSUMED the feedback to be reality.
I love summer. I have always been loving summer, as much as I love mess. People say failure is the mother of success. I say clarity is the child of mess and chaos.
Ever since I entered TM, I sensed the miraculous phenomenon permeated here with complaint and helplessness: “We should take over the C part From Marketing!” or “We don’t have system! We do everything by manual labor!” or “Always money! Isn’t money Finance’s job??”
I heard such remarks once and once again. Whenever we were doing things doomed in vain yet we had to, whenever we were having dinners after OT into near midnight, I heard my colleagues murmured complaint in such ways and felt sorry for the resentful look on their tired faces.
In the good old days of 2005 and early 2006, when everything was under control and in order, I happily took the complaint as truth and wanted to help with the way out of the mist. I did not see chaos, nor did I sense clarity. I worked diligently on system improvement and budget control, and sincerely believed that by doing so we could go out of the mist into a future Where my colleagues need not complain.
Until the summer of 2006.
Today, no one recalls the summer of 2006, except me keying in these words. No one explained to me what caused the mess in the summer of 2006, but I have kept tracking and asking until I feel the air around clears up.
The mess I experienced was mainly caused by two reasons:
(1) K started to watch revenue From 2006. All the calculation basis before 2006 was built upon volume. Revenue and volume differ dramatically. Simply put, when watching volume, sales would like to sell lower-priced faster-going SKUs. Bonus packs, which meant 25% extra vol., were mostly welcome promotions by sales, even if not really welcomed by customers and consumers. Under the revenue rule, however, low value brands started to suffer and sales tried all out to sell more higher-priced goods. Bonus pack was meaningless. It took up future purchase space of consumers without bring any extra benefit to the present.
Under the revenue rule, management started to care PTD percentage in the whole business, and the result was so shocking that we later invited Bain to search over the trade to conclude that our PTD percentage was not higher than the average level of the FMCG industry. The extremely high spending controlled by TM became a focus centre and mostly sensitive issue, which resulted in a hard 2007 OB planning.
In conclusion, the revenue rule exposed the company’s weakness. And many unreasonable presences could hide no long. We had to face them and fought over in 2006 and From then on.
(2) Unprofessionalness and feebleness of Mktg were further unclosed in the changing situation. Mktg in K is not an innovative one. One of the supporting fact is that K never launched any locally- born new brands in China. During the past 10 years or so the only thing K has been doing is extension. Brand extension, line extension, penetration, expansion, plus introducing successful foreign SKUs recommended by K Global (which surely excludes MW). Predictable results of foisting all kinds of sub-brands/SKUs into a brand include blurred brand image, wagging position, rough segmentation and finally, decreased brand value and loss of consumer loyalty.
Outside, Mktg does not have the strength to defend its brands; inside, Mktg does not have the power to defend itself. It has been doubted that according to 2007 OB TM is holding as much money as, if not more than, Mktg. Since Mktg’s money is divided into A and C two parts, while C money planning always goes with TM’s P money, in reality the real sum left in MKtg’s control is a rather poor mouthful. And even this little sum of money can not function fully: under the revenue rule without proper guidance, sales people of K can use their huge sum of P money to achieve maxim total revenue, while composition and share of each brands in this “max revenue” frequently do not agree with their strategic status designed by Mktg (…If they ever designed any. I really doubt that). For example, Mktg may invest into a new product which is strategically designed as future “star”, but sales will ingnore this product if it is not expense enough to bring along revenue shortly after its launch. With a TM controlling huge PTD, sales in K are rich. Mktg may put on TV-ads to support the new product, but sales can return PTD resources allocated for this product (together with sales target, namely, they need not sell it) in exchange for sth more expensive (that is the reason why expensive brands are always the first to run out of P money in promotion seasons).
As a result, the company relies heavily on limited several brands (SKUs, actually). Ignored brands are shrinking, new products are not cared about, and future vision is lost. Business may grow under such circumstances, but I won’t call it development.
Mktg probably have their own difficulties. I seldom talk about them. I am sales. and next I will explain why I want to leave TM, especially when it is so important and powerful department.
Because I am not an ordinary employee. An ordinary employee focuses on what his/her position or department requires. But I focuses on the company status and seek after what the market requires. My mentality is
Were the company mine.
Yap. Were the company mine. Were I the owner who is eager to defend my own business and interest, what would I do? What should I do?
I will decide that current TM is unbearable.
Firstly, current TM is not a TM. It is a finance/ commercial sub-function rather than a sales function. The supporting fact is when AP define this department they said the priority of it was Budget Control. Money control. Not business control. In reality, TM function includes
1. channel strategy planning (and calculating money)
(Which we do not do. We never had an strategy longer than one year. So we honestly call them “projects”. More over, we don’t have channel sense either. More and more over, clearly channel definition and strategy won’t help with anything even though we have them, because we don’t have human resources to cover anything other than modern trade and a few WS markets in top 30 cities. Oh, that is not TM problem, so let’s stop here and forget about it).
2. channel promotion planning (and calculating money)
(Which we do in OB. We try our best to make it more or less go along with last year’s version. The lesson is, if you make any subtle changes in your planning, e.g. you put 5% discount in 2007-Mar promotion but last year it was 6.25% in March, Boss will immediately ask you why you do that… Err, I think 6.25% is a troublesome number and 5% looks more tidy…Oh?? Do you have any business sense in that? No? Change it back!…So, the safe and smart way is to keep everything what they were. Strangely, no one will challenge you why you do not change anything…Aren’t the markets changing?)
3. Promotion preparation routine… SAP, PPP, Money process vs..Revenue/Volume process….(and calculating money)
(Which we get FP&A From Finance to help us with. At the beginning of each quarter, FP&A will kindly tell us how much each brand owns, and how much each region gets From each brand, and all we need to do is to translate each region’s money on each brand into numbers of displays and promotional volumes. For example, FP&A told me last month that in Q2 my brand Mb could have x RMB Yuan in North, y in East and z in South. Poor West does not get any money From me, though it is the second largest market for Mb. But FP&A have decided that, so I simply turned x into 100 displays and 500 tons of discounted Mb. The same with y and z. )
4. Others: New product listing, stock clearance, distributor incentive, distribution projects… (and calculating money)
It is not that calculating money is wrong. We do trade incentive and surely we spend money. The wrong point is that this TM knows nothing but money… Oh no, again I made this mistake. The wrong point is that this TM should know things other than money. Don’t forget our priority is budget control. It will seem rather strange if a budget audit function can produce channel strategy or channel promotion plans or anything like that.
Secondly, though TM is positioned as a budget control function, it is not qualified and failed in both efficiency and effectiveness due to
1. Information asymmetry & Split of rights and responsibilities between TM HQ and Frontier sales
We do not know the facts because we are sitting in the heaven, so far away From the earth. Currently our budget is built upon assumptions. The reality basis of assumptions is my evil National Store Information. I wrote to the Director the other day explaining why I suspect the price feedback From frontier has been amplified on purpose by our own sales force. The reason is simple: frontier sales knows the actual prices, and though they spend the money they do not have the responsibility of saving it. On the other hand, we several people at TM HQ are responsible for saving money, or spending the money efficiently, but we do not know the prices. It is possible that sales force can reduce the price by negotiation with buyers. But it is only possibility and sales carries risks when they can not achieve success in negotiations. And whatever money they spend, it is NOT their own money. In the end, sales force will sooner or later learn to reduce their risks by feedback a higher than actual price, and they know clearly that TM HQ will take the responsibility instead of themselves.
At the HQ level, we have only two choices: accept or not, to be or not to be. My advice to Director is that we reject the feedback and go back to 100% assumption – set up a hard standard even it is not true. Listing cost feedback in 2006 Q4 showed a 45% increase than the Q1 version, and the trend is not under control because of syndicated results From countless individual amplification behavior. But for the company, if we take whatever frontier sales tell us, K will not be able to afford any listing in 3 years.
2. “Central planned economy” model
I need not explain much here. I just feel strange. In a time even the Chinese government is busy setting up market economy, a foreign company like K should apply central planned economy within its organization. TM HQ wholly owns all its PTD, even region level does not have any resources, not to mention cities.
It is the root of all evil. It makes TM overwhelmingly powerful to break up reasonable balance between Mktg and Sales; It occupies all the attention of TM and in K no sense of channels is developed during the past years; It results that TM has to copy channel plans year on year because we knows/ notices nothing else; It makes regions and cities accept any promotion however stupid it is so long as it provides money which local does not have any; It causes high cost, low efficiency, null effectiveness; It is even the reason why K’s business nowadays heavily relies on NKA and top 30 cities — because we luckily have an NKA team, who are experts in hyper/super channel and half-experts in chain store/CVS — but no one is asked to know any other than this little part of modern trade; It is also responsible for the shrinking brands, which do not have any opportunity to shift to other channels and 2nd tier cities…
It will be going extreme by saying the company is so much lagged behind time that any little change can bring along a big progress: Reducing TM’ money and increasing A investment; Lowering budget control level to cities, making cities own and take care of their own money; Promotional budget automatically taking certain percentage of a city’s sales revenue achieved last month or quarter or whatever; Setting sales target by brands or at least strategic new brands should get protection in target setting; Linking frontier sales’ bonus with city performance…
And most important of all, changing TM’s name into Sales Administration; Limiting the function responsibility to budget/performance audit; Setting up a new function named Channel Mktg and inviting experts From Pepsi or Nestle to build up the team; CM job divided by channel (vertical) and putting category management under CM as horizontal division to set up a matrix to effectively cover channel needs.
Still, I know this is not going to happen. Not in the near future. Unusually powerful TM supports unusually powerful sales. For any reform, the cost of turbulence is high and the risk of loss and failure is large. And attack and obstruction From existed interest groups will be fierce.
Were the company mine. Thus I say so. When the company does not belong to anyone and everyone is only an employee, no one will take any risk to save the business. To save trouble, few will even think about it. Honesty, I don’t care much about K. K is only just starting to build up a company brand in China to enhance its awareness. I guess they finally realized building up product brands’ awareness one by one is really costly these days. Still K does not value its own brand. It is not like C. I do feel pity for many product brands owned by K. In Nab’s time they were legends, but today they are dying gradually in silence. If K continues in this way, those low-value brands will surely die and new brands have only narrow chances to survive, depends on whether they are born with a silver spoon in the mouth.
In the CNY period, I happily found Sgs displays in Wal-mart. It is fortunate for Sgs to be sold to W, whose achieved sales vol. within 4 months after the handover equaled K’s whole year’s sales target on this product. Good luck to you Sgs. Please continue your story in China.
The most recent news about MW is that we’ll probably give it up in China. Not forever, but for how long is not yet known. If so, what is the meaning of its launch last year? Just to appear in front of buyers and leave them a bad impression? Just gave consumers a chance of glance so that they can forget about it? When I was trying to do my work well, I took part in the crime to hurt the brand. So strange to say if I had postponed or cancelled the launch for some excuse last year, all would have been a lot better.
MW is a legend in US. To explain MW failed in China due to a stupid quality issue is like to say Sherlock Holmes died From over-eating.
======================================
I did not explain directly, but if you read carefully the words above, you can understand why I have made up my mind to leave. I tend to think a lot when I feel things not right. I want to know what the problem is and I want the solution. During the OB planned I got the chance to see the whole picture and dive deeply into it, and From then on out of a mist of mess and chaos my vision has been clearing up. In the latter part of 2006I started to track market by reading hundreds of pieces of news per day about 20+ FMCG companies, and collecting information of Sales/ TM/ CM structure and function process as much as possible whenever I met people From other companies. The problems I perceived and solutions I conceived are not castle in the air. They must have occurred elseWhere and people have had memories and experiences about them.
Thus I want to see more with my own eyes. I am not experienced enough to judge whether similar models can be applied on K, or how. So much to learn in future.








